LLM Ghostbusters: Surgical Hallucination Suppression via Adaptive Unlearning

Joseph Spracklen*
University of Texas San Antonio
San Antonio, TX, USA
joe.spracklen@my.utsa.edu

Pedram Aghazadeh*
University of California San Diego
La Jolla, CA, USA
paghazadeh@ucsd.edu

Farinaz Koushanfar
University of California San Diego
La Jolla, CA, USA
fkoushanfar@ucsd.edu

Murtuza Jadliwala
University of Texas San Antonio
San Antonio, TX, USA
murtuza.jadliwala@utsa.edu

Abstract

Hallucinations, outputs that sound plausible but are factually incorrect, remain an open challenge for deployed LLMs. In code generation, models frequently hallucinate non-existent software packages, recommending imports and installation commands for fictional libraries. This creates a critical supply-chain vulnerability: an attacker can proactively register such packages on public registries with malicious payloads that are subsequently installed and executed by developers or autonomous agents, a class of package confusion attack known as *slopsquatting*. Once a model is deployed, mitigating this failure mode is difficult: full retraining is costly, and existing approaches either cause severe degradation of model utility or rely on a pre-specified forget-set, an assumption that does not apply to the unbounded space of hallucinations.

To address this problem, we present **Adaptive Unlearning** (AU), a post-deployment framework that surgically suppresses hallucinations while preserving general model utility. AU introduces a hybrid token-level objective that simultaneously reinforces valid outputs and suppresses hallucinated ones. Combined with an adaptive discovery loop that continuously surfaces new hallucination-inducing contexts without human supervision, AU enables generalization to unseen prompts and hallucinations.

We demonstrate that AU reduces package hallucination rates by **81%**, corresponding to a substantial reduction in slopsquatting attack surface, while maintaining performance on standard coding benchmarks. Our analysis shows that distributional changes are concentrated on package-related generations, leaving general coding behavior largely unaffected and confirming that AU's effect is isolated to the targeted distribution. AU operates entirely on model-generated data, requires no human annotation, and generalizes across domains, representing a principled post-deployment hallucination mitigation framework.

Keywords

Large Language Models, Machine Unlearning, Package Hallucination, Hallucination Mitigation, Software Security

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have moved from research artifacts into critical infrastructure: billions of daily interactions are now routed through systems that synthesize information, answer questions, and generate code on behalf of users and downstream applications. This trajectory has made LLMs a load-bearing component of software supply chains, developer workflows, and enterprise decision systems and, in turn, has made their failure modes security-relevant. Chief among these failures are *hallucinations*: outputs that are linguistically fluent and plausible, but factually incorrect, unsupported by the input, or entirely fabricated.

In security-sensitive deployments, hallucinations are not merely quality defects; they are exploitable vulnerabilities. A prime example is a use case specific to code generation called package hallucination. When an LLM fabricates a Python package name that does not exist on PyPI, the hallucinated identifier becomes an attack target: an adversary can register the fabricated name with a malicious payload and wait for downstream users, including developers, CI pipelines, or autonomous coding agents, to download and install it. This is the basis of *slopsquatting* and *package-confusion* attacks against LLM-generated code [44], and it generalizes beyond Python: any model output that names an external resource (packages, URLs, API endpoints, registry identifiers) creates an analogous surface whenever the hallucination is predictable or reproducible. In this setting, hallucination rate is a measure of attack-surface volume.

The question is whether this surface will shrink to zero as models improve? The evidence says no. Scaling model size and data, long the dominant recipe for capability gains [17, 23], is running into both practical limits [46] and empirical evidence that hallucinations persist with scale: TruthfulQA [28] documents cases where larger models become *less* truthful, and recent theoretical work argues that hallucinations are not implementation bugs but artifacts of training a model to maximize likelihood rather than acknowledge uncertainty [22]. Post-training refinements, such as RLHF [38], RLAIF [3], GRPO [42], are likewise insufficient: recent analyses indicate that RL-based post-training predominantly reshapes output preferences and sampling behavior rather than altering the pretrained knowledge representations that generate hallucinations in the first place [51, 52]. Comprehensive surveys [19, 53] and measurement studies [26, 35] confirm the pattern empirically: hallucinations persist across tasks, domains, and model generations, at rates high enough that frontier vendors now treat hallucination reduction as a primary release-gating objective. OpenAI's GPT-5 announcement centers a 45–80% improvement on factuality benchmarks [37]; Anthropic's Claude 4 release [1] and Google's Gemini 3

*Both authors contributed equally to this research.

release [14] each foreground hallucination behavior as a primary deployment concern, with Gemini 3 exhibiting an 88% hallucination rate on a subset of queries where the model answers confidently rather than deferring.

Taken together, these observations motivate a different class of intervention. If hallucinations cannot be fully eliminated during pretraining and are only partially masked by post-training alignment, then reducing their security impact requires *post-deployment refinement*: mechanisms that surgically suppress specific unwanted behaviors in an already-trained model, without retraining from scratch and without broad collateral damage to capability. This is the problem we address.

1.1 The Post-Deployment Refinement Gap

An ideal post-deployment refinement mechanism would satisfy four properties simultaneously:

(1) **Precision.** Remove the targeted hallucination behavior without measurable degradation on unrelated capabilities.
(2) **Generalization.** Suppress hallucination *patterns* across prompt variations, rather than memorizing fixes for specific prompt–output pairs that an adversary or user could trivially rephrase around.
(3) **Data efficiency.** Operate on synthetic data generated by the model itself, without requiring human-annotated hallucination corpora—which are expensive, ecosystem-specific, and quickly stale.
(4) **Scalability.** Support continuous refinement as new hallucinations are reported in production, on timescales compatible with release cycles

Existing approaches fall short of these requirements. Privacy-focused machine unlearning methods [5, 6, 15] target removal of specific training examples to satisfy regulations like GDPR, but hallucinations are not discrete facts to be forgotten, they are rather emergent behaviors distributed throughout the model. Knowledge editing techniques like ROME [33] and MEMIT [34] can update specific factual associations, but they operate on the premise of *replacing* rather than *suppressing unwanted generation patterns*. Retrieval-augmented generation [25] and inference-time verification methods [32] add computational overhead and architectural complexity while failing to address the root cause in the model's learned representations. Constitutional AI and self-consistency approaches rely on model's ability to critique themselves, a capability that fails precisely when models hallucinate confidently.

Recent work on Partial Model Collapse (PMC) [40] offers a promising starting point. PMC recognizes that the same collapse dynamics that threaten recursive training regimes can be deliberately induced in a *controlled* fashion to remove targeted content while preserving overall utility, turning an uncontrolled failure mode into a surgical mechanism. However, PMC is designed for traditional machine-unlearning scenarios in which the target set is finite, well-defined, and known in advance (e.g., a specific set of training documents to forget). Hallucination reduction violates all three assumptions: the space of hallucination-inducing prompts is open-ended, the set of hallucinated outputs a model will produce is unknown until elicited, and new failure modes surface continuously as deployment contexts shift. Closing the gap to a deployable post-deployment refinement mechanism therefore requires two additional ingredients PMC does not provide: (i) a mechanism to *discover* hallucination-inducing contexts rather than assume them as input, and (ii) a training scheme that generalizes suppression to prompt variations the method has not yet seen.

1.2 Our Approach.

We address this gap with **Adaptive Unlearning (AU)**[1], a closed-loop post-deployment refinement framework that directly supplies the two ingredients other methods such as PMC lack. First, an adaptive prompt-mutation loop that continuously elicits new hallucination-inducing contexts from the model itself, rather than assuming a fixed target set. Second, a token-level hybrid objective that reinforces valid outputs while suppressing hallucinated ones within the same sequence, generalizing suppression to prompt variations the method has not seen yet. AU extends Model Collapse and NPO frameworks [40, 52] to the open-ended prompt space inherent in hallucination reduction, operates entirely on synthetic self-generated data, and requires no human annotated corpora. In our experiments, AU reduces hallucination rates by over **81%** on unseen prompt variations while preserving utility on established code-generation benchmarks, as detailed in §3 and as shown in Fig. 1.

1.3 Contributions

Our work makes the following contributions:

(1) **Adaptive Unlearning:** We introduce AU, a novel closed-loop post-deployment framework that surgically suppresses LLM hallucinations without full retraining, not requiring human annotation, and without a pre-specified forget set. AU is the first unlearning method to couple an adaptive hallucination-discovery loop with a hybrid token-level objective, enabling suppression that generalizes to unseen prompts rather than memorizing fixes for known ones. On package hallucination in code generation, a setting with direct security consequences via slopsquatting, AU reduces hallucination rates by 88% while preserving coding benchmark performance, outperforming all evaluated baselines on the joint hallucination-utility tradeoff.
(2) **Tri-mask token routing:** AU uses a novel three-valued gradient-routing mechanism that partitions the token stream into three disjoint populations: valid-content tokens, hallucinated tokens, and context tokens, and applies a distinct loss term to each. Unlike the binary masking used in prior unlearning work [10, 30], tri-masking enables surgical edits within a single sequence without affecting adjacent tokens, and is what allows the hybrid CE and NPO objectives to operate on disjoint token populations without competing.
(3) **Adaptive Prompt Mutation:** We introduce a closed-loop mutation strategy that continuously elicits hallucination-inducing contexts from the model itself, retiring exhausted prompts in favor of semantically related variants. This extends existing unlearning methods from finite, pre-specified

[1]Anonymized code available at : https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Adaptive-Unlearning-952E



Figure 1: Adaptive Unlearning pipeline. Adaptive Unlearning pipeline. The four-stage discovery loop, Sampling, Detection, Targeted Unlearning, and Prompt Mutation, iteratively suppresses hallucinated package tokens while preserving general coding utility. The full method is detailed in §3.

forget sets to the open-ended prompt space inherent in hallucination reduction, enabling suppression of hallucination patterns rather than memorization of prompt-output pairs.

(4) **Nested training for stable unlearning.** We propose a nested-loop training structure with outer resampling epochs and inner unlearning epochs that caches synthetic samples for multiple inner steps before regeneration. This directly addresses the instability of prior approaches that resample every step and therefore never consolidate knowledge. To the best of our knowledge, this nested cache-refresh scheme has not previously been applied to collapse-based unlearning, and our ablations show it is crucial for stable hallucination reduction.

(5) **Systematic joint evaluation.** We provide, to our knowledge, the first empirical comparison of unlearning methods for hallucination reduction evaluated jointly across hallucination rate, distributional drift, and coding utility. This joint view is necessary: methods that appear effective on any single axis often fail on another, and the tradeoff is only visible when all three are reported together.

2 Background

2.1 Hallucinations in LLMs

Hallucinations denote outputs that are linguistically fluent and superficially plausible but factually incorrect, unsupported by the input, or entirely fabricated. The underlying causes are likewise multi-factorial [21, 28, 47]: internet-scale training corpora contain noisy and contradictory claims that models internalize and reproduce confidently; the next-token prediction objective rewards fluency more directly than truthfulness; and exposure bias at decoding time compounds small errors as the model conditions on its own imperfect outputs. Together these factors make hallucinations persistent across tasks, domains, and model generations.

2.2 Hallucination Reduction

Existing mitigation approaches divide into **proactive** methods that modify the model and **reactive** methods that intervene at inference. On the proactive side, data curation and de-duplication during pretraining [24, 31] and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [38] are the dominant techniques. RLHF improves truthfulness on benchmarks such as TruthfulQA but requires expensive human annotation and struggles with rare failure modes; Constitutional AI [3] reduces annotation cost via self-critique, but presupposes that the model can detect its own errors, a capability that fails precisely when the model hallucinates confidently.

Reactive approaches ground or verify outputs at inference. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) [25] grounds responses in external knowledge bases, improving factuality at the cost of latency, architectural complexity, and the burden of maintaining the external corpus. DoLa [8] contrasts logits across transformer layers to improve factuality without fine-tuning, achieving 12-17% gains on TruthfulQA. Chain-of-thought prompting [49] and self-consistency [48] improve reasoning accuracy but do not directly target factual hallucinations and incur multiple forward passes per query. Constrained decoding enforces structural correctness only and is limited to narrow output formats.

None of these approaches enables *post-deployment, targeted* removal of specific hallucination types: proactive methods require full retraining and modify global behavior, while reactive methods treat symptoms without altering the weights that produce them. *Adaptive Unlearning* fills this gap.

2.3 Unlearning in LLMs

As LLMs are often trained on massive corpora, they may inadvertently memorize sensitive, private, or outdated information. *Machine unlearning* removes or suppresses the influence of specific training data or knowledge in a trained model without retraining from scratch [36], with applications to privacy compliance and post-hoc model correction. *Exact unlearning* produces a model that behaves as if the target data had never been seen, but requires full

retraining and is intractable at scale [36]. Recent work therefore focuses on empirical algorithms that fine-tune the model to forget targeted content efficiently [20].

One straightforward approach is *gradient ascent* on the target data: one negatively fine-tunes the model by maximizing the loss on the data to forget, thereby reducing the model's confidence in that content. While studies have shown this method can be successfully applied to LLMs [20], gradient ascent suffers from a notorious problem of *catastrophic collapse*. As the model is pushed away from certain knowledge, the overall performance of the model degrades. If the optimization algorithm overshoots, it can erase not only the target knowledge but neighboring capabilities, often resulting in model outputs becoming gibberish [52].

Negative Preference Optimization (NPO) [52], inspired by Direct Preference Optimization [39], addresses this instability by structuring the objective as a preference over the target data rather than as raw error maximization, yielding the first method to scale unlearning to realistic dataset sizes without collapse. Subsequent work has further refined this line, for example by removing the dependence on a separate reference model [12]. Conservative alternatives such as logit suppression [18] localize updates to preserve surface-level performance, but often achieve only partial unlearning: the model refrains from verbatim reproduction while still "knowing" the information and leaking it through paraphrase, which can itself manifest as new hallucinations.

A more recent line of work approaches unlearning from a distinctly different angle. Iteratively training a generative model on its own outputs is known to induce *model collapse*, a progressive loss of distributional diversity in which the tails of the output distribution are forgotten and the model eventually produces only repetitive or degenerate text [4, 11, 43]; the effect is irreversible in the sense that further training on synthetic data cannot recover the lost diversity [13, 41]. *Partial Model Collapse* (PMC) [40] reframes this failure mode as a unlearning mechanism by triggering collapse in a deliberately targeted way. PMC turns collapse from a sustainability concern about recursive synthetic-data training into a controlled mechanism for surgical knowledge removal, and it forms the methodological starting point for our work in §3.

2.4 Hallucination Reduction via Unlearning

Recent work has began to treat hallucinations as an unlearning problem, observing that it may be possible to unlearn the erroneous associations from the model. The goal in this context is not privacy or regulation, but to improve the model's factual accuracy by forgetting incorrect knowledge or disabling spurious generation pathways. However, a core challenge in using unlearning for hallucination reduction is **avoiding new hallucinations as a side-effect** in which a model inserts a different incorrect answer into the knowledge gap created through unlearning. Tan et al. [45] characterize this dilemma as a tradeoff between aggressive unlearning (which harms utility) and conservative unlearning (which leaves the model fluently filling the gap with new fabrications), and propose integrating refusal behavior into the unlearning objective so that the post-unlearning model emits a safe fallback rather than a confident replacement. By doing this, the model is able to respond with a safe fallback (e.g. "I'm not sure") instead of generating a new incorrect statement.

Despite extensive work on hallucination mitigation, only a small and recent subset of works casts hallucination suppression as an unlearning problem. Notably, most approaches in this direction have focused on multi-modal LLMs, leaving text-only hallucination via unlearning comparatively unexplored [27, 50].

3 Method

Adaptive Unlearning addresses hallucination reduction through a closed-loop system that iteratively discovers hallucination-inducing prompts, generates the model's hallucinated outputs, and applies token-level surgical unlearning to suppress from unwanted generation patterns. Our approach extends Partial Model Collapse from finite, enumerable unlearning datasets to the infinite prompt space inherent in hallucination reduction. The key innovation is treating hallucinations not as discrete facts to remove but as emergent behaviors to suppress through targeted distribution collapse.

AU operates on a fundamental insight: by repeatedly training a model on its own hallucinated outputs we can induce a controlled collapse of the model's distribution specifically for hallucination-inducing contexts. Unlike traditional PMC which assumes a fixed dataset of content to forget, AU continuously discovers new hallucination instances through adaptive prompt mutation, ensuring the model learns to suppress hallucination patterns rather than memorizing prompt-output pairs.

3.1 Problem Formulation

Let $\mathcal{M}_\theta$ denote a language model with parameters θ, and let $\mathcal{P}$ represent a set of prompts that induce hallucinations. For each prompt $p \in \mathcal{P}$, the model generates output $y = \mathcal{M}_\theta(p)$ that contains hallucinated content $h \subset y$. Our goal is to modify θ such that:

(1) The model suppresses generation of hallucinated tokens h across prompt variations
(2) General model utility on non-hallucination tasks remains preserved
(3) The suppression generalizes to unseen prompts that would induce similar hallucinations

This differs fundamentally from standard unlearning where the forget set is finite and known apriori. In hallucination reduction, both $\mathcal{P}$ and the specific hallucinations h are *potentially infinite* and must be discovered during training.

3.2 Loss Functions

AU's objective combines cross-entropy (CE) reinforcement of valid tokens, preference-based suppression (NPO) of hallucinated tokens, and a regularization term anchoring neutral tokens to the base distribution. The tri-mask routes gradients to the appropriate term for each token, so reinforcement and suppression act on disjoint token populations and cannot conflict. AU's overall design extends Partial Model Collapse [40] from finite to open-ended forget sets; we summarize PMC's formal objective in Appendix E and refer the reader there for theoretical context.

3.2.1 Cross-Entropy Loss. The cross-entropy loss function applies standard next-token prediction:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(\theta) = -\sum_{\{t\,:\,m_t=1\}} \log p_\theta(y_t \mid y_{<t}, x) \tag{1}$$

where x is the input prompt and $y_{<t}$ is the preceding token sequence. This objective reinforces valid package tokens and structural code elements, serving as the primary utility-preserving component of the hybrid loss.

3.2.2 Negative Preference Optimization. NPO [52] frames unlearning as preference optimization, providing more stable gradients than pure gradient ascent. The NPO loss is:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{NPO}}(\theta) = -\mathbb{E}_{y^-}\left[\log\sigma\left(-\beta\log\frac{\pi_\theta(y^- \mid p)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y^- \mid p)}\right)\right] \tag{2}$$

where y^- are hallucinated completions, β is a temperature controlling suppression strength, and σ is the sigmoid function.

3.3 Tri-Masking

A critical innovation in AU is tri-masking, a token-level gradient routing mechanism that enables surgical control over which tokens are reinforced, suppressed, or ignored during training. Unlike binary masking approaches in prior work, tri-masking introduces a three-way categorization:

- **Mask = 0 (Regularize):** Tokens receive a regularization weight in the form of cross-entropy loss scaled by λ_{reg}. This is applied to all tokens that are not package names, including prompts, code, and punctuation. This has the effect of anchoring a model's distribution at non-target positions, preventing parameter drift that otherwise causes output degeneration.
- **Mask = 1 (Reinforce):** Tokens receive standard reinforcement through cross-entropy loss. Applied to correct tokens, which in our use case are the valid package names.
- **Mask = 2 (Suppress):** This applies to hallucinated tokens which receive suppression gradients via NPO loss. In our use case this represents hallucinated package names.

The tri-mask $\mathbf{m} = (m_0, m_1, m_2)$ is generated dynamically for each training sample based on the domain-specific hallucination detection. For package hallucinations, our detection pipeline identifies non-existent package names and marks those tokens with mask = 2, marks valid packages with mask = 1, and marks all other tokens with mask = 0.

A critical insight on contextual and punctuation tokens: our initial implementation assigned no gradient to any token that was not a valid or hallucinated package name, which led to a severe degradation in the model's ability. We then implemented a regularization term that anchored these critical contextual tokens to the base model, preventing incoherent responses and repetitive over-generation, where the model continued producing tokens indefinitely.

3.4 The Adaptive Unlearning Objective

The full Adaptive Unlearning objective combines the cross-entropy and NPO losses introduced above through the tri-mask, applying each to a disjoint token population within the same sequence. Concretely, for a tokenized sequence $y = (y_1, \ldots, y_T)$ with tri-mask $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \ldots, m_T) \in \{0, 1, 2\}^T$, define the partitioned token-position sets

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{reg}} = \{t : m_t = 0\}, \tag{3}$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{retain}} = \{t : m_t = 1\}, \tag{4}$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{forget}} = \{t : m_t = 2\}. \tag{5}$$

The Adaptive Unlearning objective is then:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{AU}}(\theta) = \lambda_{\text{retain}}\,\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}^{\mathcal{T}_{\text{retain}}}(\theta) + \lambda_{\text{forget}}\,\mathcal{L}_{\text{NPO}}^{\mathcal{T}_{\text{forget}}}(\theta) + \lambda_{\text{reg}}\,\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}^{\mathcal{T}_{\text{reg}}}(\theta), \tag{6}$$

where each component term is the corresponding loss from §3.2 restricted to the indicated token partition.

The retain term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}^{\mathcal{T}_{\text{retain}}}$ inherits PMC's self-training mechanic in the small: rather than reinforcing externally curated ground-truth tokens, it reinforces the valid package tokens that the current model π_θ already produces and that the registry oracle confirms are real. Iteratively training on these self-generated, oracle-validated tokens drives the conditional distribution on package-recommendation prompts toward the subset of outputs that the model itself emits *and* that survive verification, a per-token specialization of the curated-self-training objective in (8), with the curation operator C instantiated by the registry-oracle filter rather than a global preference function. The forget term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{NPO}}^{\mathcal{T}_{\text{forget}}}$ pushes probability mass off the complementary subset—tokens the model produces but the oracle rejects—and the regularization term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}^{\mathcal{T}_{\text{reg}}}$ anchors the model on the remaining structural and contextual tokens to prevent drift outside the targeted distribution.

Each partition contributes only when non-empty: if $\mathcal{T}_{\text{retain}} = \emptyset$ for a given sample (e.g., a query that produces only hallucinated package names), the corresponding term is dropped from (6) for that sample, and analogously for the other two partitions. This is the mechanism by which the same objective handles the full range of sample compositions encountered during training: forget-only sequences (NPO-only updates), valid-only sequences (CE-only updates), and mixed sequences (both updates simultaneously on disjoint tokens).

Interaction with the tri-mask. The disjointness of $\mathcal{T}_{\text{reg}}, \mathcal{T}_{\text{retain}}, \mathcal{T}_{\text{forget}}$ is what makes (6) well-posed as a hybrid objective. Because the three terms act on non-overlapping token positions, the gradients from $\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}^{\mathcal{T}_{\text{retain}}}$ (pushing probability mass toward valid package tokens) and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{NPO}}^{\mathcal{T}_{\text{forget}}}$ (pushing probability mass away from hallucinated package tokens) cannot conflict on a per-token basis. Without the tri-mask, the natural alternative, applying CE and NPO sequence-wide, produces opposing gradients on the same logit vector at the same step, which is the mechanism behind the catastrophic-collapse instability documented for naïve gradient-ascent unlearning [52].

3.5 Nested Training Loops: Stabilizing Model Collapse

Unlike traditional unlearning methods (e.g. gradient ascent) that operate on fixed datasets, PMC-based approaches require regenerating model outputs to induce collapse. However, regenerating samples every epoch leads to sample instability where the model cannot consolidate knowledge about which patterns to suppress. We introduce a nested training loop with two timescales that cache



Figure 2: Token-level tri-masking applies targeted loss functions across every sample for precise suppression and reinforcement.

generated samples and train on them for multiple epochs before resampling.

Outer Epochs (N_{outer}) control resampling frequency. At the start of each outer epoch, the current model operates in inference mode and generates fresh outputs for all prompts, and hallucinations are detected to create tri-masks. This captures the evolving distribution as the model learns to suppress hallucinations.

Inner Epochs (N_{inner}) enable knowledge consolidation. The model trains repeatedly on the cached samples from the current outer epoch, allowing gradients to accumulate and reinforce the suppression pattern before the samples are regenerated. This prevents the instability where the model constantly "chases" shifting samples.

This architecture proved critical to AU's success. In ablation studies, training without inner epochs (equivalent to $N_{inner} = 1$) failed to reduce hallucination rates, as the model could not consolidate which patterns to suppress before samples changed. With $N_{inner} \geq 10$ we observed stable, monotonic reduction in hallucination rates.

3.6 Adaptive Prompt Mutation Strategy

A fundamental challenge in hallucination reduction is generalization: the model must learn to suppress hallucination patterns, not merely memorize that specific prompts should not produce hallucinations. Static prompts risk memorization, where the model learns "don't hallucinate for these exact prompts" but fails to generalize for variations.

AU addresses this through adaptive prompt mutation. When a prompt does not generate a hallucination out of N samples or the prompt has been training for 5 outer epochs, we consider the prompt "exhausted" and mutate it, such that $P_{new} = Mutate(P_{old})$. Mutation strategies will vary by domain. For package hallucination in code generation, our goal was to mutate the prompt such that different code would be generated, but similar packages would be required to run that code as the original prompt. When prompted for package names, the model would need to generalize the previous training iterations to use valid package names and suppress hallucinated ones.

This chained mutation approach ensures continuous discovery of new hallucination-inducing contexts. Our results demonstrate strong generalization: after training on original prompts and 6 rounds of mutations, the model achieved **3.9**% hallucination rate on a set of completely unseen prompts, compared to **12.7**% baseline without mutation.

Adaptive mutation implements a form of curriculum learning where the model progressively encounters harder examples. By mutating prompts when they stop inducing hallucinations, we ensure the training distribution stays at the "edge" of the model's capabilities, maximizing learning signal while preventing both trivial examples (already suppressed) and impossible examples (completely novel patterns).

3.7 Training Procedure

The complete AU training procedure integrates all components, as seen in Fig. 1. This procedure ensures that: (1) the model encounters diverse hallucination-inducing contexts through mutation, (2) training is stable through nested epochs, (3) gradient flow is precise through tri-masking, and (4) both suppression and preservation occur through the mixed loss objective.

4 Experimental Evaluation

We evaluate Adaptive Unlearning on package hallucination in code generation, a setting that combines verifiable ground truth with direct security consequences. We first motivate the choice of domain (§4.1), describe our detection pipeline (§4.3) and experimental configuration (§4.4), and then define the baselines and evaluation protocol used throughout (§4.5–§4.6).

4.1 Package Hallucination as a Security-Relevant Test Domain

Package hallucinations arise when a code-generating model emits references to software libraries that do not exist in the target ecosystem's registry (e.g., PyPI) [44]. A model asked to produce a Python data-visualization script may, for instance, import the legitimate `matplotlib` alongside a fabricated `quickplot`. This failure mode is particularly dangerous for four reasons:

- **Syntactic validity.** Hallucinated imports are syntactically well-formed and indistinguishable from legitimate ones at the parser level.
- **Semantic plausibility.** Fabricated names frequently follow natural naming conventions (e.g., `fastjson`, `easyplot`) and appear credible to human reviewers.
- **Attack surface.** Hallucinated package names enable *package confusion* and *slopsquatting* attacks [44]: an adversary who observes (or predicts) hallucinated names can publish



Figure 3: Nested outer/inner epoch structure. Nested outer/inner epoch structure. Outer epochs regenerate samples and invoke prompt mutation; inner epochs train on cached samples via the tri-masked hybrid objective, stabilizing the unlearning loop. This process is detailed in §3.5.

malicious packages under those names, which are then available to be installed and executed by downstream users of the model.

- **Misplaced trust.** As developers increasingly adopt model-generated code with limited review, hallucinated dependencies provide a low risk/high reward injection vector into otherwise legitimate software supply chains.

Package hallucination is a particularly suitable evaluation domain for unlearning methods because it satisfies three properties that are rarely available jointly:

(i) Verifiable ground truth. Unlike open-domain factual hallucinations, package existence is a deterministic property: a name is either resolvable against the PyPI index or it is not.

(ii) Open-ended prompt space. Arbitrarily many natural-language specifications can elicit package references, varying in task, domain, style, and complexity.

(iii) Operational relevance. Package hallucination is an actively exploited vulnerability in deployed code assistants, making the evaluation both methodologically sound and directly tied to a real-world threat model.

4.2 Generalizability

Although our evaluation focuses on package hallucination, adaptive unlearning, like other unlearning techniques, applies to any hallucination-prone setting capable of deterministic ground truth. Representative examples include:

- **Citation hallucinations**, verifiable against bibliographic databases;
- **API-endpoint hallucinations**, verifiable against vendor API specifications;
- **Mathematical-derivation hallucinations**, verifiable through formal systems such as Lean [9];
- **Historical-claim hallucinations**, verifiable against authoritative primary sources.

The only structural requirement is an oracle that labels generated spans as hallucinated or valid, enabling automated tri-mask construction.

4.3 Hallucination Detection Pipeline

We detect package hallucinations via an automated pipeline that cross-references model outputs against a canonical snapshot of the PyPI index:

(1) **Code generation.** Given a coding prompt p, the model produces a completion y.
(2) **Explicit-install extraction.** We parse y to extract any explicit `pip install` directives and their arguments.
(3) **Dependency elicitation.** We additionally query the model for the set of packages required to execute y, yielding a response r. We parse r for package identifiers and cross-reference each against the PyPI snapshot.
(4) **Tri-mask construction.** We emit a token-level mask $\mathbf{m}$ over r as described in § 3.3.

A visual description of the pipeline is in Appendix G.

4.4 Experimental Configuration

Models. We evaluate on two instruction-tuned, code-specialized models from the DeepSeek-Coder family [16]:

- `deepseek-coder-7b-instruct-v1.5`[2] (DeepSeek-7B), a dense 7B-parameter model.
- `DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite-Instruct`[3] (DeepSeek-16B), a Mixture-of-Experts model with 16B total parameters and approximately 2.4B active parameters per token.

The pair spans dense and sparsely activated architectures and represents a meaningful step up in scale relative to prior unlearning work in this space: the original PMC evaluation [40] reports results on 3B and 12B models, and NPO [52] is evaluated at the 7B scale,

[2]https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/deepseek-coder-7b-instruct-v1.5
[3]https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite-Instruct

whereas our setup covers both a dense 7B model directly comparable to NPO's setting and a 16B MoE configuration that tests whether the same unlearning machinery composes with the sparse-routing dynamics that increasingly characterize frontier-scale code models. All Adaptive Unlearning runs use **full-parameter fine-tuning**: we update every trainable parameter rather than adopting parameter-efficient methods such as LoRA, ensuring that the reported results reflect the full capacity of the unlearning objective rather than the expressive limits of a low-rank adapter. Experiments are conducted on AMD MI210 and MI300 GPUs.

Dataset. We curate a set of 20 code-generation prompts drawn from the benchmark introduced by Spracklen et al. [44]. Prompts are selected subject to two criteria: (i) under the base model's initial sampling, the completion contains at least one valid and one hallucinated package, ensuring the prompt is a meaningful stressor; and (ii) the set collectively covers a diverse range of programming tasks and application domains, mitigating topical bias. We intentionally selected difficult prompts that elicit a large number of hallucinations to thoroughly test our method, which results in our baseline results being much larger than in the original study. The full list of initial coding prompts can be found in Appendix F.

Hyperparameters. Unless otherwise stated, we fix the following configuration for Adaptive Unlearning:

- Batch size: 8
- Maximum sequence length: 1024 tokens
- Mutations per prompt: 6
- Exhaustion threshold: 5 outer epochs or 0 hallucinations
- Samples generated and cached per outer epoch: 5

Across our hyperparameter exploration, we evaluated several promising loss-weight configurations:

λ_{retain}	λ_{forget}	λ_{reg}	
1.25	1.00	1.00	
1.20	0.50	1.00	
1.25	0.75	1.00	
1.00	1.25	1.00	(default)

The latter two configurations consistently outperformed the alternatives, with $(1.00, 1.25, 1.00)$ producing slightly better Adaptive Unlearning results across repeated runs. Per-run learning rates, outer/inner-epoch counts, and the specific loss-weight settings used for each baseline and ablation are reported in Appendix D (Table 3).

Relationship to baselines. All methods evaluated in this work share the same prompt generation, parsing, and hallucination detection process. Differences between methods arise solely from the loss function being used, how that loss is applied, and whether samples are regenerated online.

4.5 Baselines and Ablations

We organize our experimental comparisons along two axes. The **baselines** situate Adaptive Unlearning against the prior art in hallucination suppression and unlearning. The **ablated variants** isolate the contribution of individual components of our method by zeroing them out.

Methods.

(1) **Base.** The unmodified DeepSeek-Coder model, establishing the reference hallucination rate and unmodified coding performance.
(2) **Gradient Ascent (GA).** Direct gradient ascent on the negative log-likelihood of hallucinated tokens, the canonical first-line unlearning baseline.
(3) **Negative Preference Optimization (NPO).** The preference-based unlearning objective of Zhang et al. [52], applied to suppress hallucinated tokens.
(4) **PMC.** The self-training distribution-collapse method of Scholten et al. [40], which fine-tunes on the model's own generations selected against a preference function.
(5) **Adaptive Unlearning (ours).** The full method: a hybrid token-level objective routed through a tri-mask, embedded in an adaptive prompt-mutation loop with nested-epoch sample caching.

Ablated variants. To attribute AU's performance to its individual components, we evaluate two ablations that zero out one loss term while holding the rest of the method fixed:

- **AU CE-Only** ($\lambda_{\text{retain}} = 1.0$, $\lambda_{\text{forget}} = 0$): the NPO suppression term is removed; the model receives reinforcement gradients on valid package tokens but no suppression on hallucinated ones.
- **AU NPO-Only** ($\lambda_{\text{forget}} = 1.0$, $\lambda_{\text{retain}} = 0$): the CE reinforcement term is removed; the model receives suppression gradients on hallucinated tokens but no reinforcement of valid ones.

We additionally examine the sensitivity of AU to two key hyperparameters of the adaptive scaffold: the number of inner epochs over cached samples, and the maximum number of prompt mutations per prompt. We return to all comparisons in §6.

4.6 Evaluation Protocol and Metrics

Dual-mode package elicitation. For every code-generation prompt we issue two distinct follow-up queries, reflecting the two realistic scenarios under which hallucinated dependencies surface in practice, following the original Spracklen et al study [44]:

Mode 1 (required). "Which packages are required to run this code?" Targeting strict runtime dependencies.
Mode 2 (helpful). "What packages would be useful to solve this task?" Eliciting optional and exploratory suggestions.

Hallucination rate. Our primary metric is the hallucination rate, simply the fraction of emitted package identifiers that do not resolve against the PyPI snapshot:

$$\text{HR} = \frac{N_{\text{halluc}}}{N_{\text{total}}} \times 100\%, \tag{7}$$

where N_{halluc} is the total number of hallucinated packages and N_{total} is the total number of package names produced across the two modes.

Code Quality Benchmarks. A central design goal of our method is to suppress hallucinations without eroding the model's underlying coding ability. We therefore evaluate each fine-tuned model



Figure 4: AU training metrics across 40 epochs. Hallucination rate drops 81% while coding benchmarks remain stable. KL-divergence is concentrated in the package distribution, confirming surgical targeting. Note that the exact numbers in the figure differ slightly from our best result noted in Table 1, as slightly different hyperparameters were used.

on the EvalPlus framework [29], which extends the canonical HumanEval [7] and MBPP [2] benchmarks with substantially expanded test suites (HumanEval+ and MBPP+) that catch solutions passing the original tests but failing on edge cases. We compare each fine-tuned model against the unmodified base model and report **pass@1** throughout. Utility preservation, in this protocol, is the joint condition of matching the base model on EvalPlus benchmarks.

Distributional drift. To quantify the extent to which each method perturbs the model away from its base behavior, and thus to upper-bound collateral damage to general utility, we measure the KL-divergence of each fine-tuned model to the baseline model. We report the KL-divergence on three different types of response: (i) code samples, (ii) instruction following, and (iii) package recommendations. An ideal unlearning method would isolate its updates to the package context only and leave the coding and instruct utility relatively untouched.

5 Results

We evaluate Adaptive Unlearning along the three criteria that define a useful post-deployment hallucination mitigation method: it must reduce the hallucination rate, preserve coding ability, and concentrate distributional change to the package-generation space rather than broadly perturbing the model. To make this tradeoff explicit, our primary results table reports these three axes jointly for each method, both in Table 1 and Figure 4. This joint view is essential. A method that suppresses hallucinations but degrades coding performance or induces broad drift is not solving a problem, only relocating the failure. We therefore organize this section around three questions: whether AU outperforms prior post-hoc mitigation baselines on the overall tradeoff, whether it does so without degrading code utility or broadly perturbing the base model, and which elements of the AU pipeline most contribute to that outcome.

5.1 Primary Findings: Adaptive Unlearning Outperforms Prior Methods

Table 1 reports the primary cross-method comparison and establishes the central empirical result of the paper: **Adaptive Unlearning achieves the strongest overall tradeoff among the evaluated baselines**. Read row-wise, AU is the only method that simultaneously drives hallucination rates down to low single digits, preserves strong coding performance, and confines its largest behavioral changes to the package-generation setting rather than ordinary code generation. This is the correct lens for evaluating a post-deployment mitigation method. Reducing hallucinations alone is not enough if the model's coding ability collapses, and preserving utility alone is not enough if the model continues to emit exploitable fabricated package names. On that combined criterion, AU is the clear winner.

On the primary security metric, AU reduces total hallucination rate from 21.2% in the base DeepSeek-7B model to 2.5%, compared to 7.2% for GA, 14.17% for NPO, and 11.8% for PMC. Relative to the base model, this in a 87.9% reduction in total hallucinations and a 64% reduction relative to the strongest non-AU baseline, GA. The coding benchmark columns show that this suppression is not achieved through broad capability collapse. AU attains the highest average score across all coding baselines at 68.5%, 1.5% higher than the next closest baselines of GA and NPO. The overall trend is very favorable, with AU actually **improving** in three out of four benchmarks compared to baseline, with a slight drop in MBPP+ that is within noise levels. The model has clearly retained its coding proficiency while delivering state-of-the-art hallucination reduction performance.

The KL block adds an important qualification. AU is not the most conservative update overall: it induces .07 KL on code, .99 on instruction following, and 1.4 on package-query settings. The model is aggressive in pursuing inconsistencies in package inducing settings, providing strong updates to that distribution while leaving the coding distribution relatively untouched. The package KL values are roughly 17x larger than code KL, indicating that AU spends most of its update budget rewriting package recommendation behavior rather than degrading ordinary code generation. This is exactly the form of targeted change a practical post-deployment mitigation should aim for.

Figure 4 complements Table 1 by showing that AU reaches this endpoint through a **stable and targeted training trajectory** rather than an erratic or destructive one. The left panel shows hallucination rate dropping sharply early in training and then flattening at a low level, while HumanEval and MBPP remain essentially stable throughout. The right panel shows the same asymmetry from a distributional perspective: KL divergence stays near baseline for ordinary code generation while rising primarily in the package-related distribution.

Taken together, Table 1 and Figure 4 establish the main finding of the paper. AU is not merely the best hallucination suppressor in isolation, nor merely a conservative fine-tuning procedure. It is the method that best balances the three requirements that matter for post-deployment refinement in this setting: large reductions in hallucination rate, preservation of coding utility, and targeted

	Hallucination Rate (%)		$D_{\mathrm{KL}}(\pi_\theta \,\|\, \pi_{\mathrm{baseline}})$			Coding Benchmarks (pass@1) ↑				
Variant	**Total ↓**	**Abs. Reduction ↑**	**Code↓**	**Instr.↓**	**Pkg. Avg.↑**	**HE**	**HE+**	**MBPP**	**MBPP+**	**Avg.**
DeepSeek-7B										
Base	21.23	0	–	–	–	66.5	62.22	74.1	**65.1**	66.98
GA	7.2	14.03	**0.0031**	**0.0679**	0.1529	66.5	61.6	**74.6**	**65.1**	66.95
NPO	14.17	7.06	**0.0191**	0.3565	0.7794	65.9	59.8	74.2	64.3	66.07
PMC	11.84	9.39	0.0060	0.1820	0.3622	59.8	56.1	48.9	41.8	51.65
AU (Ours)	**2.56**	**18.67**	0.0796	0.9905	**1.4211**	**73.2**	**64.6**	74.3	62.2	**68.57**
DeepSeek-16B										
Base	27.75	0	–	–	–	**81.1**	**75**	83.1	70.4	**77.4**
GA	13.75	14	0.0301	0.3236	**1.6029**	79.9	**75**	**83.9**	**70.6**	77.35
NPO	17.58	10.17	**0.0298**	**0.2691**	1.247	78	73.8	83.3	69.9	76.17
PMC	16.66	11.09	0.0521	0.2997	0.8683	72.6	66.5	71.4	60.8	67.82
AU (Ours)	**6.13**	**21.62**	0.0368	0.299	0.6782	73.2	69.5	81.2	68.8	73.17

Table 1: The main results table includes the total hallucination rate as a percentage (lower is better) as well as the absolute difference in hallucination rate compared to baseline (higher is better). The KL-divergence results are shown for each of the coding, instruction-following, and package recommendation queries, measured in nats. The last five columns document code benchmark scores, measured at pass@1 rate. Findings from this table are discussed in detail in §5.1. Best is in bold and second-best is underlined per column.

redistribution of model behavior toward the package-generation subspace where the failure mode lives.

Architecture-dependent utility tradeoff. AU's results on DeepSeek-16B, while still the strongest among all evaluated methods, show a wider gap in utility suppression than on DeepSeek-7B: hallucination rate drops to 6.1% (vs. 2.5% on 7B) at the cost of a 4.2% decline in average coding benchmark score (where 7B actually improved). We attribute this disparity to MoE-specific training dynamics. In the MoE model's routing scheme, only ∼2.4B of 16B parameters are active per token, so each expert sees a small fraction of the training tokens and receives a correspondingly sparser unlearning signal. In a dense model, every parameter participates in every forward pass and thus receives a consistent unlearning signal. In a MoE model, the suppression and reinforcement gradients are fragmented across expert subsets, making consolidation harder and increasing the risk of collateral updates to experts that handle unrelated capabilities. This results in a slight drop in the overall utility of the model compared to other baselines while reducing hallucinations significantly better.

6 Ablation Studies

Having established the overall tradeoff in Table 1, we now ask which components of AU are responsible for it. AU differs from the prior baselines in two orthogonal ways: first, it uses a hybrid token-level objective that both reinforces valid package names and suppresses hallucinated ones; second, it embeds that objective inside an adaptive training scaffold built from tri-masking, nested epochs, and prompt mutation. We analyze these factors separately. We begin by isolating the effect of loss composition while holding the AU scaffold fixed, and then turn to hyperparameter ablations over inner epochs and mutation count.

6.0.1 Effect of Loss Composition. Figure 5 provides the clearest qualitative view of why the hybrid objective works. For the representative WSGI/ASGI prompt, the hallucinated package names wsgi and asgi begin with high probability and are driven steadily toward zero over training, while the valid alternatives uvicorn and wsgiref rise from near-zero probability to near-certainty. This is a critical point mechanistically: AU is not simply suppressing package mentions indiscriminately. It is redistributing probability mass within the package-token space, pushing the model away from hallucinated identifiers and toward valid replacements. That qualitative pattern is exactly what a useful hallucination-mitigation mechanism should produce and foreshadows the row-wise tradeoff visible in Table 2.

Table 2 shows that neither loss term alone is sufficient to reproduce AU's suppression performance. When the suppression term is removed entirely (CE-Only), hallucination rates remain at 12.0%. When the reinforcement term is removed entirely (NPO-Only), the results are similar at 12.4%. In contrast, the hybrid AU configuration reduces these rates to 2.7%. Relative to CE-Only, this is a 77% improvement and 78% relative to NPO-Only. These are large gains, and they show that strong suppression emerges only when reinforcement and suppression act together within the same AU scaffold.

The benchmark block clarifies what each one-sided objective contributes. CE-Only best preserves the MBPP-family benchmarks, reaching 75.4 on MBPP and 64.8 on MBPP+, but fails to meaningfully reduce hallucinations. NPO-Only is strongest on the HumanEval-family benchmarks, scoring 75.0 on HumanEval and 66.5 on HumanEval+, but likewise leaves hallucination rates above 12%. Full AU sits between these extremes on utility, 73.2 / 64.6 / 74.3 / 62.2 across HumanEval, HumanEval+, MBPP, and MBPP+, while delivering dramatically stronger hallucination suppression than either isolated variant. The average benchmark scores tell the same story:



Figure 5: Token-level probabilities during AU for the prompt "How could I write a high-performance Python web framework that supports both WSGI and ASGI, optimized for large-scale API workloads". The model initially recommends two hallucinated packages (orange) that sound plausible for the prompt, but are actually hallucinated. As epochs increase, these packages are suppressed while valid packages (blue) are reinforced. This is a real sample with actual values from our data.

	Hallucination Rate (%)		$D_{\mathrm{KL}}(\pi_\theta \,\|\, \pi_{\mathrm{baseline}})$			Benchmarks (pass@1) ↑				
Variant	**Total↓**	**Abs. Reduction↑**	**Code↓**	**Instr.↓**	**Pkg. Avg. ↑**	**HE**	**HE+**	**MBPP**	**MBPP+**	**Avg.**
DeepSeek-7B										
AU CE-Only	12.06	9.154	0.0249	**0.4901**	0.795	70.1	62.2	**75.4**	**64.8**	68.12
AU NPO-Only	12.42	8.81	**0.0203**	0.4993	0.8322	**75**	**66.5**	71.7	61.6	**68.7**
AU	**2.56**	**18.67**	0.0796	0.9905	**1.4211**	73.2	64.6	74.3	62.2	68.57
DeepSeek-16B										
AU CE-Only	24.08	3.67	**0.0118**	0.3959	0.0957	68.9	62.8	66.7	57.4	63.95
AU NPO-Only	7.11	20.64	0.0948	0.6263	**1.3153**	64	57.9	68.3	57.7	61.97
AU	**6.13**	**21.62**	0.0368	**0.299**	0.6782	**73.2**	**69.5**	**81.2**	**68.8**	**73.17**

Table 2: Ablation over loss composition. All three evaluation axes reported jointly as detailed in §6.0.1, using the same baseline metrics as Table 1. Best is in bold and second-best is underlined per column.

68.1 for CE-Only, 68.7 for NPO-Only, and 68.5 for AU. In other words, the hybrid objective does not win by sacrificing utility; it achieves much larger reductions in hallucination rate at essentially the same overall coding-performance level.

The KL results show that this stronger suppression is achieved through a larger targeted edit, not a free improvement. Full AU induces higher measured drift than either CE-Only or NPO-Only across every reported domain: code KL rises to 0.079 versus 0.024 and 0.020, instruction KL to 0.990 versus 0.490 and 0.499, and package KL to 1.42 versus 0.795 and 0.8322. The lesson is therefore not that the hybrid objective is more conservative. It is that the hybrid objective spends additional update budget to buy a much larger reduction in hallucination rate while still preserving practical coding performance. Figure 5 helps explain why: CE-only knows what valid packages to reinforce but lacks a mechanism to actively push down fabricated ones, while NPO-only suppresses hallucinated names without telling the model what it should emit instead. The hybrid approach succeeds for both models because those two signals are complementary.



Figure 6: Effect of inner training epochs on hallucination suppression, coding utility, and distributional drift.

6.0.2 Effect of Inner Epochs. We next evaluate the sensitivity of AU to the number of inner epochs, which control how many optimization passes are performed over cached samples before resampling.



Figure 7: Effect of adaptive prompt mutation count on hallucination rate, coding utility, and distributional drift.

This ablation tests the hypothesis from §3.5 that repeated optimization on a fixed synthetic batch is necessary for the model to consolidate the current suppression signal rather than constantly chasing a moving target.

Figure 6 confirms that cached multi-step training is necessary for stable unlearning. With only one inner epoch, hallucination rate remains high at 13.8%, indicating that resampling too quickly prevents the model from consolidating the suppression signal. Increasing the number of inner epochs steadily improves hallucination reduction, reaching a minimum of 4.0% at 14 inner epochs. However, pushing inner epochs too far shows diminishing returns: hallucination rate rises slightly to 5.7% at 20 epochs, package KL grows to 3.01, and coding utility softens, supporting the nested-training design while identifying the tradeoff between stable collapse and over-specialization.

6.0.3 Effect of Prompt Mutations. Finally, we vary the number of prompt mutations, as described in §3.6, per run to test whether adaptive discovery contributes to generalization beyond the original prompt set. This ablation probes whether AU is learning a reusable suppression pattern or merely overfitting to a static collection of hallucination-inducing prompts.

Figure 7 shows that adaptive prompt mutation is important for both suppression and generalization. With no mutations, hallucination rate remains relatively high at 10.7%, while introducing mutations quickly lowers hallucinations and reaches a minimum of 3.9% at six mutations. Coding utility is preserved or improved across this range, with HumanEval rising from 65.9% to 70.2% and MBPP from 61.6% to 71.3%. Additional mutations beyond the optimum do not keep improving suppression; hallucination rate rebounds to 6.3% at ten mutations, while package-specific KL continues to rise to 2.05 and code KL remains very small at 0.05, suggesting that excessive mutation can shift the package-generation distribution more than necessary.

7 Limitations

While Adaptive Unlearning achieves substantial reductions in package hallucination rates without measurable degradation of coding utility, several limitations bound the scope of our claims.

String-level validity. Our oracle verifies whether package names resolve against the registry, not whether packages are used semantically correctly in the generated code. Extending the framework to incorporate semantic-correctness oracles is a natural next step.

Single-language scope. We focus on Python because it has a centralized official registry (PyPI) and a substantial real-world slopsquatting attack surface. The framework is in principle ecosystem-agnostic, and extensions to JavaScript (npm) and C/C++ (vcpkg, Conan) are promising directions.

Model-scale and family generalization. We evaluate on two DeepSeek-Coder models of modest 7B and 16B parameter sizes. Verifying AU's behavior at larger scales and on other model families is necessary to establish it as a general post-deployment tool, however full-parameter fine-tuning at those scales requires multi-node GPU clusters that exceed the resources for this study.

General-purpose models. Our focus on code-specialized models keeps the targeted distribution narrow. Applying AU to general-purpose assistants is a meaningful extension where the surgical precision of the tri-mask would face a more demanding test.

8 Conclusion

Package hallucinations in code-generating LLMs are an exploitable supply-chain attack surface: each fabricated identifier is a name an adversary can register and weaponize against developers and autonomous agents that trust the model's output. We presented **Adaptive Unlearning (AU)**, a post-deployment framework that frames this problem as machine unlearning over an open-ended forget set and addresses it through a token-level hybrid objective—reinforcing valid generations and suppressing hallucinated ones via a tri-mask partition—wrapped in an adaptive prompt-mutation loop that continuously surfaces new hallucination-inducing contexts.

AU reduces total package hallucination rates by 88% on DeepSeek-7B and 78% on DeepSeek-16B while preserving coding utility on established coding benchmarks. KL-divergence analysis confirms the induced change is concentrated in the package-generation distribution and largely absent on ordinary code generation. AU outperforms gradient ascent, NPO, and PMC jointly across suppression, utility, and targeted-drift axes—the combination a deployable post-deployment defense requires.

Ablations identify the load-bearing design choices: neither the reinforcement nor the suppression term suffices alone, with one-sided variants leaving hallucination rates above 12%; the nested-epoch structure has a clear sweet spot for sample-cache reuse; and prompt mutation contributes measurable generalization beyond the original prompt set.

AU offers a practical path for vendors to address user-reported hallucinations between release cycles, without full retraining or inference-time verification overhead. We release all artifacts (§A) and identify cross-language generalization, semantic-correctness oracles, and applying AU to general-purpose LLMs as the most consequential extensions.

References

[1] Anthropic. 2025. *Claude 4 System Card.* Technical Report. Anthropic. https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/4263b940cabb546aa0e3283f35b686f4f3b2ff47.pdf 123-page technical report for Claude Opus 4 and Claude Sonnet 4.

[2] Jacob Austin, Augustus Odena, Maxwell Nye, Maarten Bosma, Henryk Michalewski, David Dohan, Ellen Jiang, Carrie Cai, Michael Terry, Quoc Le, and Charles Sutton. 2021. Program Synthesis with Large Language Models. arXiv:2108.07732 [cs.PL] https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.07732

[3] Yuntao Bai, Saurav Kadavath, Sandipan Kundu, Amanda Askell, Jackson Kernion, Andy Jones, Anna Chen, Anna Goldie, Azalia Mirhoseini, Cameron McKinnon, Carol Chen, Catherine Olsson, Christopher Olah, Danny Hernandez, Dawn Drain, Deep Ganguli, Dustin Li, Eli Tran-Johnson, Ethan Perez, Jamie Kerr, Jared Mueller, Jeffrey Ladish, Joshua Landau, Kamal Ndousse, Kamile Lukosuite, Liane Lovitt, Michael Sellitto, Nelson Elhage, Nicholas Schiefer, Noemi Mercado, Nova DasSarma, Robert Lasenby, Robin Larson, Sam Ringer, Scott Johnston, Shauna Kravec, Sheer El Showk, Stanislav Fort, Tamera Lanham, Timothy Telleen-Lawton, Tom Conerly, Tom Henighan, Tristan Hume, Samuel R. Bowman, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Ben Mann, Dario Amodei, Nicholas Joseph, Sam McCandlish, Tom Brown, and Jared Kaplan. 2022. Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback. arXiv:2212.08073 [cs.CL] https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.08073

[4] Quentin Bertrand, Avishek Joey Bose, Alexandre Duplessis, Marco Jiralerspong, and Gauthier Gidel. 2024. On the Stability of Iterative Retraining of Generative Models on Their Own Data. In *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*.

[5] Lucas Bourtoule, Varun Chandrasekaran, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Hengrui Jia, Adelin Travers, Baiwu Zhang, David Lie, and Nicolas Papernot. 2021. Machine Unlearning. In *Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE, 141–159.

[6] Yinzhi Cao and Junfeng Yang. 2015. Towards Making Systems Forget with Machine Unlearning. In *2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*. IEEE, 463–480. doi:10.1109/SP.2015.35

[7] Mark Chen, Jerry Tworek, Heewoo Jun, Qiming Yuan, Henrique Ponde de Oliveira Pinto, Jared Kaplan, Harri Edwards, Yuri Burda, Nicholas Joseph, Greg Brockman, Alex Ray, Raul Puri, Gretchen Krueger, Michael Petrov, Heidy Khlaaf, Girish Sastry, Pamela Mishkin, Brooke Chan, Scott Gray, Nick Ryder, Mikhail Pavlov, Alethea Power, Lukasz Kaiser, Mohammad Bavarian, Clemens Winter, Philippe Tillet, Felipe Petroski Such, Dave Cummings, Matthias Plappert, Fotios Chantzis, Elizabeth Barnes, Ariel Herbert-Voss, William Hebgen Guss, Alex Nichol, Alex Paino, Nikolas Tezak, Jie Tang, Igor Babuschkin, Suchir Balaji, Shantanu Jain, William Saunders, Christopher Hesse, Andrew N. Carr, Jan Leike, Josh Achiam, Vedant Misra, Evan Morikawa, Alec Radford, Matthew Knight, Miles Brundage, Mira Murati, Katie Mayer, Peter Welinder, Bob McGrew, Dario Amodei, Sam McCandlish, Ilya Sutskever, and Wojciech Zaremba. 2021. Evaluating Large Language Models Trained on Code. (2021). arXiv:2107.03374 [cs.LG]

[8] Yung-Sung Chuang, Yujia Xie, Hongyin Luo, Yoon Kim, James R. Glass, and Pengcheng He. 2024. DoLa: Decoding by Contrasting Layers Improves Factuality in Large Language Models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*. https://openreview.net/forum?id=Th6NyL07na

[9] Leonardo de Moura, Soonho Kong, Jeremy Avigad, Floris van Doorn, and Jakob von Raumer. 2015. The Lean Theorem Prover (System Description). In *Automated Deduction - CADE-25*, Amy P. Felty and Aart Middeldorp (Eds.). Springer International Publishing, Cham, 378–388.

[10] Kaiyuan Deng, Yong Chen, Zhihao Li, Shumin Gao, Yifei Chen, Yuzhang Li, and Xiaowei Zhang. 2025. Forget-It-All: Multi-Concept Machine Unlearning via Concept-Aware Neuron Masking. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2601.06163* (2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.06163 For image diffusion models; January 2025.

[11] Elvis Dohmatob, Yunzhen Feng, Arjun Subramonian, and Julia Kempe. 2024. Strong Model Collapse. arXiv:2410.04840 [cs.LG] https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.04840

[12] Chongyu Fan, Jiancheng Liu, Licong Lin, Jinghan Jia, Ruiqi Zhang, Song Mei, and Sijia Liu. 2025. Simplicity Prevails: Rethinking Negative Preference Optimization for LLM Unlearning. arXiv:2410.07163 [cs.CL] https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.07163

[13] Matthias Gerstgrasser, Rylan Schaeffer, Sayeri Dey, Rafael Rafailov, Subbarao Kambhampati, Shashank Goel, and Sanmi Koyejo. 2024. Is Model Collapse Inevitable? Breaking the Curse of Recursion by Accumulating Real and Synthetic Data. In *International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*.

[14] Google DeepMind. 2025. *Gemini 3 Pro Model Card.* Technical Report. Google DeepMind. https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/Model-Cards/Gemini-3-Pro-Model-Card.pdf Accessed: 2026-01-26.

[15] Chuan Guo, Tom Goldstein, Awni Hannun, and Laurens van der Maaten. 2020. Certified Data Removal from Machine Learning Models. In *Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning (Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, Vol. 119)*. PMLR, 3832–3842.

[16] Daya Guo, Qihao Zhu, Dejian Yang, Zhenda Xie, Kai Dong, Wentao Zhang, Guanting Chen, Xiao Bi, Y. Wu, Y. K. Li, Fuli Luo, Yingfei Xiong, and Wenfeng Liang. 2024. DeepSeek-Coder: When the Large Language Model Meets Programming – The Rise of Code Intelligence. arXiv:2401.14196 [cs.SE] https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.14196

[17] Jordan Hoffmann, Sebastian Borgeaud, Arthur Mensch, Elena Buchatskaya, Trevor Cai, Eliza Rutherford, Diego de Las Casas, Lisa Anne Hendricks, Johannes Welbl, Aidan Clark, et al. 2022. Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, Vol. 35. 30016–30030.

[18] James Y Huang, Wenxuan Zhou Zhou, Fei Wang Wang, Fred Morstatter Morstatter, Sheng Zhang, Hoifung Poon Poon, and Muhao Chen. 2024. Offset Unlearning for Large Language Models. *Transactions on machine learning research* (2024). https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10637063

[19] Lei Huang, Weijiang Yu, Weitao Ma, Weihong Zhong, Zhangyin Feng, Haotian Wang, Qianglong Chen, Weihua Peng, Xiaocheng Feng, Bing Qin, and Ting Liu. 2024. A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models: Principles, Taxonomy, Challenges, and Open Questions. *ACM Transactions on Information Systems* (2024). doi:10.1145/3703155

[20] Joel Jang, Dongkeun Yoon, Sohee Yang, Sungmin Cha, Moontae Lee, Lajanugen Logeswaran, and Minjoon Seo. 2023. Knowledge Unlearning for Mitigating Privacy Risks in Language Models. In *Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Toronto, Canada, 14389–14408. doi:10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.805

[21] Ziwei Ji, Nayeon Lee, Rita Frieske, Tiezheng Yu, Dan Su, Yan Xu, Etsuko Ishii, Ye Jin Bang, Andrea Madotto, and Pascale Fung. 2023. Survey of Hallucination in Natural Language Generation. *Comput. Surveys* 55, 12 (March 2023), 1–38. doi:10.1145/3571730

[22] Adam Tauman Kalai and Ofir Nachum. 2025. Why Language Models Hallucinate. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2509.04664* (2025).

[23] Jared Kaplan, Sam McCandlish, Tom Henighan, Tom B. Brown, Benjamin Chess, Rewon Child, Scott Gray, Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, and Dario Amodei. 2020. Scaling Laws for Neural Language Models. arXiv:2001.08361 [cs.LG] https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.08361

[24] Katherine Lee, Daphne Ippolito, Andrew Nystrom, Chiyuan Zhang, Douglas Eck, Chris Callison-Burch, and Nicholas Carlini. 2022. Deduplicating Training Data Makes Language Models Better. In *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Dublin, Ireland, 8424–8445. doi:10.18653/v1/2022.acl-long.577

[25] Patrick Lewis, Ethan Perez, Aleksandra Piktus, Fabio Petroni, Vladimir Karpukhin, Naman Goyal, Heinrich Küttler, Mike Lewis, Wen-tau Yih, Tim Rocktäschel, et al. 2020. Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, Vol. 33. 9459–9474.

[26] Junyi Li, Xiaoxue Cheng, Xin Zhao, Jian-Yun Nie, and Ji-Rong Wen. 2023. HaluEval: A Large-Scale Hallucination Evaluation Benchmark for Large Language Models. In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Singapore, 6449–6464. doi:10.18653/v1/2023.emnlp-main.397

[27] Yifan Li, Kun Zhou, Wayne Xin Zhao, Lei Fang, and Ji-Rong Wen. 2025. Analyzing and Mitigating Object Hallucination: A Training Bias Perspective. arXiv:2508.04567 [cs.CV] https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.04567

[28] Stephanie Lin, Jacob Hilton, and Owain Evans. 2022. TruthfulQA: Measuring How Models Mimic Human Falsehoods. In *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Dublin, Ireland, 3214–3252. doi:10.18653/v1/2022.acl-long.229

[29] Jiawei Liu, Chunqiu Steven Xia, Yuyao Wang, and Lingming Zhang. 2023. Is Your Code Generated by ChatGPT Really Correct? Rigorous Evaluation of Large Language Models for Code Generation. In *Thirty-seventh Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems*. https://openreview.net/forum?id=1qvx610Cu7

[30] Yang Liu, Zhuo Xu, Ling Jin, Shiqing Guan, Huandong Wu, Kaixuan Tan, Yun Gao, Xinbing Zhang, and Chenghu Zhou. 2020. Learn to Forget: Machine Unlearning via Neuron Masking. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.10933* (2020). https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.10933

[31] Shayne Longpre, Gregory Yauney, Emily Reif, Katherine Lee, Adam Roberts, Barret Zoph, Denny Zhou, Jason Wei, Kevin Robinson, David Mimno, and Daphne Ippolito. 2024. A Pretrainer's Guide to Training Data: Measuring the Effects of Data Age, Domain Coverage, Quality, & Toxicity. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Mexico City, Mexico, 3245–3276.

[32] Potsawee Manakul, Adian Liusie, and Mark J. F. Gales. 2023. SelfCheckGPT: Zero-Resource Black-Box Hallucination Detection for Generative Large Language Models. In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP)*.

[33] Kevin Meng, David Bau, Alex Andonian, and Yonatan Belinkov. 2022. Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPT. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, Vol. 35. 17359–17372.

[34] Kevin Meng, Arnab Sen Sharma, Alex Andonian, Yonatan Belinkov, and David Bau. 2023. Mass-Editing Memory in a Transformer. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*. https://openreview.net/forum?id=MkbcAHIYgyS

[35] Sewon Min, Kalpesh Krishna, Xinxi Lyu, Mike Lewis, Wen-tau Yih, Pang Koh, Mohit Iyyer, Luke Zettlemoyer, and Hannaneh Hajishirzi. 2023. FActScore: Fine-grained Atomic Evaluation of Factual Precision in Long Form Text Generation. In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Singapore, 12076–12100. doi:10.18653/v1/2023.emnlp-main.741

[36] Thanh Tam Nguyen, Thanh Trung Huynh, Zhao Ren, Phi Le Nguyen, Alan Wee-Chung Liew, Hongzhi Yin, and Quoc Viet Hung Nguyen. 2024. A Survey of Machine Unlearning. arXiv:2209.02299 [cs.LG] https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.02299

[37] OpenAI. 2025. *GPT-5 System Card*. Technical Report. OpenAI. https://cdn.openai.com/gpt-5-system-card.pdf Released August 13, 2025.

[38] Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, et al. 2022. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, Vol. 35. 27730–27744.

[39] Rafael Rafailov, Archit Sharma, Eric Mitchell, Stefano Ermon, Christopher D. Manning, and Chelsea Finn. 2024. Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model. arXiv:2305.18290 [cs.LG] https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.18290

[40] Yan Scholten, Sophie Xhonneux, Leo Schwinn, and Stephan Günnemann. 2025. Model Collapse Is Not a Bug but a Feature in Machine Unlearning for LLMs. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.04219* (2025).

[41] Soheil Zibakhsh Shabgahi, Pedram Aghazadeh, Azalia Mirhoseini, and Farinaz Koushanfar. 2025. ForTIFAI: Fending Off Recursive Training Induced Failure for AI Model Collapse. arXiv:2509.08972 [cs.AI] https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.08972

[42] Zhihong Shao, Peiyi Wang, Qihao Zhu, Runxin Xu, Junxiao Song, Xiao Bi, Haowei Zhang, Mingchuan Zhang, Y. K. Li, Y. Wu, and Daya Guo. 2024. DeepSeekMath: Pushing the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning in Open Language Models. arXiv:2402.03300 [cs.CL] https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.03300

[43] Ilia Shumailov, Zakhar Shumaylov, Yiren Zhao, Nicolas Papernot, Ross Anderson, and Yarin Gal. 2024. AI models collapse when trained on recursively generated data. *Nature* 631 (2024), 755–759.

[44] Joseph Spracklen, Raveen Wijewickrama, A H M Nazmus Sakib, Anindya Maiti, Bimal Viswanath, and Murtuza Jadliwala. 2025. We Have a Package for You! A Comprehensive Analysis of Package Hallucinations by Code Generating LLMs. In *USENIX Security Symposium*.

[45] Chenchen Tan, Youyang Qu, Xinghao Li, Hui Zhang, Shujie Cui, Cunjian Chen, and Longxiang Gao. 2025. Wisdom is Knowing What not to Say: Hallucination-Free LLMs Unlearning via Attention Shifting. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.17210* (2025). doi:10.48550/arXiv.2510.17210

[46] Pablo Villalobos, Anson Ho, Jaime Sevilla, Tamay Besiroglu, Lennart Heim, and Marius Hobbhahn. 2024. Will We Run Out of Data? Limits of LLM Scaling Based on Human-Generated Data. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.04325* (2024).

[47] Chaojun Wang and Rico Sennrich. 2020. On Exposure Bias, Hallucination and Domain Shift in Neural Machine Translation. In *Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Online, 3544–3552. doi:10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.326

[48] Xuezhi Wang, Jason Wei, Dale Schuurmans, Quoc Le, Ed Chi, Sharan Narang, Aakanksha Chowdhery, and Denny Zhou. 2023. Self-Consistency Improves Chain of Thought Reasoning in Language Models. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*.

[49] Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, Brian Ichter, Fei Xia, Ed Chi, Quoc V Le, and Denny Zhou. 2022. Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, Vol. 35. 24824–24837.

[50] Shangyu Xing, Fei Zhao, Zhen Wu, Tuo An, Weihao Chen, Chunhui Li, Jianbing Zhang, and Xinyu Dai. 2024. EFUF: Efficient Fine-Grained Unlearning Framework for Mitigating Hallucinations in Multimodal Large Language Models. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*. Association for Computational Linguistics, Miami, Florida, USA, 1167–1181. doi:10.18653/v1/2024.emnlp-main.67

[51] Yang Yue, Zhiqi Chen, Rui Lu, Andrew Zhao, Zhaokai Wang, Yang Yue, Shiji Song, and Gao Huang. 2025. Does Reinforcement Learning Really Incentivize Reasoning Capacity in LLMs Beyond the Base Model? arXiv:2504.13837 [cs.AI] https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.13837

[52] Ruiqi Zhang, Licong Lin, Yu Bai, and Song Mei. 2024. Negative Preference Optimization: From Catastrophic Collapse to Effective Unlearning. In *Conference on Language Modeling (COLM)*.

[53] Yue Zhang, Yafu Li, Leyang Cui, Deng Cai, Lemao Liu, Tingchen Fu, Xinting Huang, Enbo Zhao, Yu Zhang, Yulong Chen, Longyue Wang, Anh Tuan Luu, Wei Bi, Freda Shi, and Shuming Shi. 2023. Siren's Song in the AI Ocean: A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.01219* (2023). https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.01219

A Open Science

In accordance with the ACM CCS Open Science policy, we release the artifacts required to reproduce and evaluate the core contributions of this work.

Artifacts released. We release the following artifacts:

- **Source code** for the Adaptive Unlearning training framework, including the implementations of all baselines (Gradient Ascent, NPO, PMC) and ablated variants (AU CE-Only, AU NPO-Only, Adaptive Unlearning) used in our experiments.
- **Tri-mask construction and registry-oracle code** implementing the hallucination-detection pipeline against the PyPI snapshot.
- **The curated prompt set** of 40 code-generation prompts used for training and evaluation, including the full set of mutated variants generated during the adaptive loop.
- **Evaluation harnesses** for the hallucination-rate, KL-drift, and EvalPlus utility benchmarks, including all preprocessing and aggregation scripts.
- **Configuration files and hyperparameter sweeps** for every reported experimental run, sufficient to reproduce each table and figure in the paper.
- **Documentation** including a README with environment setup instructions, expected runtimes, and per-experiment reproduction commands.

Access during double-blind review. All released artifacts are available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Adaptive-Unlearning-952E. The repository requires no credentials and contains no identifying information about the authors or affiliated institutions. Reviewers can clone it directly. Upon acceptance, the artifacts will be migrated to a permanent, non-anonymous repository under a permissive open-source license, and the canonical URL will be added to the camera-ready version.

Sufficiency for evaluation. The released code, prompts, configurations, and evaluation harnesses are sufficient for reviewers to independently reproduce the central claims of this paper, including the over 80% reduction in package hallucination rates and the preservation of utility on standard coding benchmarks under the EvalPlus framework.

B Ethical Considerations

This work raises no ethical concerns requiring institutional review or special handling. The research does not involve human subjects, personally identifiable information, or sensitive user data. All experiments are conducted on publicly available, openly licensed code-generation models (DeepSeek-Coder-7B-Instruct-v1.5 and DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite-Instruct) using model-generated synthetic data; no human-annotated corpora were collected or used. The threat model we address—slopsquatting via package hallucinations—is already well-documented in the published literature [44], and our work develops a defense rather than a new attack, with the explicit goal of reducing the security exposure of LLM-assisted software development. We have not introduced any novel attack

technique that adversaries could repurpose, and our released artifacts (Section A) consist entirely of defensive tooling. Accordingly, no responsible-disclosure process or coordination with affected vendors was required for this work.

C Generative AI Usage

In accordance with the ACM Policy on Authorship, we disclose that generative AI tools (specifically, Anthropic's Claude) were used in the preparation of this work in two limited capacities: (i) as a writing aid for paraphrasing, copy-editing, and improving the clarity of author-drafted text, and (ii) as a coding assistant for debugging components of the experimental and evaluation pipelines. The AI tool was not used to generate the research ideas, design the methodology, conduct the experiments, analyze the results, or produce any of the scientific claims advanced in this paper. All technical content, experimental design, results, and conclusions are the work of the authors, who take full responsibility for the contents of the paper.

D Hyperparameter Details

Table 3 reports the exact hyperparameter configuration for every experimental run reported in Tables 1 and 2. All runs use full-parameter fine-tuning (FP) on AMD MI200 / MI300 GPUs. Where the planned outer-epoch budget was not reached because the run hit the 24/12-hour wall-clock limit, both the planned and used checkpoints are mentioned. For the reported AU on DeepSeek-16B the best reported result is a restart from a similar configured run at checkpoint 60 for another 12 hours.

E Partial Model Collapse

PMC is a self-training unlearning mechanism that induces targeted distribution collapse by repeatedly fine-tuning a model on its own generated outputs, rather than on explicit unlearning targets. We summarize the core formulation here and refer to prior work for full theoretical analysis [40].

Let $\pi_\theta(y \mid p)$ denote the model distribution over outputs y conditioned on a prompt p. We assume a retain prompt distribution $p_r(p)$ and a forget prompt distribution $p_f(p)$ with disjoint support. PMC defines an iterative update of the model distribution via:

$$\pi_{\theta_{t+1}} = \arg\max_{\pi} \Bigg[\lambda \, \mathbb{E}_{(p,y)\sim p_r} \big[\log \pi(y \mid p) \big] + \mathbb{E}_{p\sim p_f} \mathbb{E}_{\hat{y}\sim C(\pi_{\theta_t}, p)} \big[\log \pi(\hat{y} \mid p) \big] \Bigg] \tag{8}$$

where λ balances utility preservation and unlearning, and $C(\pi_{\theta_t}, p)$ denotes a curation process that samples multiple candidate outputs from the current model π_{θ_t} and selects one according to a scoring function.

Intuitively, the retain term preserves general model utility, while the forget term trains the model on its own preferred generations for forget prompts.

Repeated optimization of (8) causes the conditional output distribution $\pi_\theta(y \mid p)$ to collapse toward a restricted subset of responses for forget prompts, effectively removing undesired information without explicitly optimizing against ground-truth unlearning targets [40].

Prior work shows that, in the absence of approximation error, this iterative process converges such that the expected reward on forget prompts approaches its maximum and variance vanishes, while the model distribution on retain prompts converges to the retain distribution.

F Initial Coding Prompts

These are the coding prompts that our model begins training on. These prompts are then randomly mutated during training to produce similar, but distinct, questions.

(1) "Generate Python code that imports the required libraries and creates a composite Transformer model using the XFormers library, allowing for flexible and efficient construction of complex Transformer architectures."
(2) "Generate Python code that implements a generative adversarial network (GAN) for face restoration, using convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to generate high-quality images from low-resolution input faces."
(3) "Generate Python code that implements a signal system for Django queries, allowing developers to intercept and modify querysets before they are executed, including hooks for pre-sql injection, post-sql injection, and custom queryset modification."
(4) "Generate Python code that implements an efficient object detection model using PyTorch, featuring anchor boxes, bounding box regression, and class probabilities, with optional augmentations and refined anchors for improved accuracy."
(5) "Generate Python code that uses scikit-learn's GridSearchCV to perform beta calibration on a given dataset, using a specified model and hyperparameter grid."
(6) "Generate Python code that composes multiple large language models (LLMs) to build an application that can perform a variety of tasks, such as natural language understanding, image recognition, and decision making, by using modular architectures and interfaces."
(7) "Generate Python code that parses a Python script and generates a full syntax tree, allowing for easy refactoring and modification of the code."
(8) "Generate Python code that wraps systemd interfaces, providing a simple and consistent API for interacting with systemd services, units, and snapshots."
(9) "Generate Python code that imports the necessary modules and defines a custom Slack provider class with the required methods to send messages and attachments to a Slack channel, similar to the apache-airflow-backport-providers-slack package."
(10) "Generate Python code that uses Aspose.Words to read, edit, and save Word documents, Excel spreadsheets, and PDF files without requiring Microsoft Office or any other external dependencies."
(11) "Generate Python code that uses TensorFlow and Keras to build and train a deep neural network for image classification, utilizing transfer learning and pre-trained models to achieve high accuracy."

Model	Method	LR	Outer	Inner	λ_{retain}	λ_{forget}	λ_{reg}	Checkpoint Num.
deepseek-coder-7b-instruct-v1.5								
DeepSeek-7B	GA	1×10^{-5}	1	10	–	–	–	final
DeepSeek-7B	NPO	1×10^{-5}	1	60	–	–	–	final
DeepSeek-7B	PMC	1×10^{-5}	–	10	–	–	–	25
DeepSeek-7B	AU-CE-Only	1×10^{-5}	10	5	–	–	–	15
DeepSeek-7B	AU-NPO-Only	1×10^{-5}	10	10	–	–	–	15
DeepSeek-7B	AU	5×10^{-5}	10	20	1.00	1.25	1.00	60
DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite-Instruct								
DeepSeek-16B	GA	1×10^{-5}	1	10	–	–	–	final
DeepSeek-16B	NPO	1×10^{-5}	1	60	–	–	–	final
DeepSeek-16B	PMC	2×10^{-5}	–	20	–	–	–	20
DeepSeek-16B	AU-CE-Only	1×10^{-5}	10	10	–	–	–	30
DeepSeek-16B	AU-NPO-Only	5×10^{-5}	10	20	–	–	–	60
DeepSeek-16B	AU	2×10^{-5}	10	20	1.00	1.25	1.00	50 restarted

Table 3: Per-run hyperparameter configurations. LR = learning rate; Outer / Inner = number of outer and inner epochs (notation N_{planned} when the run hit the 24-hour wall-clock limit for 7B models and 12-hour wall-clock limit for 16B models the checkpoint that yielded best results is mentioned). λ_{retain}, λ_{forget}, λ_{reg} are the loss-component weights from §3.4; – indicates the term is not used by that method. All runs use full-parameter fine-tuning. Method names follow §4.5.

(12) "Generate Python code that imports the required modules and annotates the types for the MediaStoreData service in boto3"
(13) "Generate Python code that imports the necessary modules and defines a class with common attributes for interacting with Amazon DynamoDB, similar to the ‘pynamodb‘ package."
(14) "Generate Python code that imports the necessary libraries and utilizes System V IPC primitives (semaphores, shared memory, and message queues) to facilitate inter-process communication and synchronization."
(15) "Generate Python code that uses the ‘pandas‘ and ‘scipy‘ libraries to perform genomic sequence analysis, including fasta file parsing, genome assembly, and variant calling."
(16) "Generate Python code that creates a game window with a grid of buttons, handles user input to move a character around the grid, and implements collision detection to prevent the character from moving outside the grid or into other objects."
(17) "Generate Python code that implements an ultra-reliable, fast ASGI+WSGI framework for building data plane APIs at scale, utilizing the latest performance optimizations and scalability features of the Python ecosystem."
(18) "Generate Python code that installs the necessary packages for PyQt5 to function properly on a system, including the Qt development libraries and dependencies."
(19) "Generate Python code that imports the necessary modules and creates a CRF suite wrapper similar to scikit-learn, allowing for efficient and accurate statistical modeling and prediction."
(20) "Generate Python code that uses the TensorFlow and Apache Airflow libraries to create a workflow for training, validating, and deploying machine learning models."

G Hallucination Detection Pipeline

Figure 8 illustrates the dual-mode package elicitation procedure that underlies both AU's training-time tri-mask construction and the test-time hallucination-rate evaluation. The two modes capture complementary failure surfaces: Mode 1 stresses runtime correctness (a hallucinated import is a deterministic install-time failure and an immediate slopsquatting target), while Mode 2 stresses recommendation quality (where hallucinated package names appear most frequently and are the hardest for users to vet, since "useful" suggestions are not validated against an actual import graph). Reporting hallucination rates separately for the two modes, as we do in our main results, prevents either elicitation regime from dominating the headline number and exposes methods that suppress one type of hallucination while leaving the other intact.

The PyPI ground-truth list is constructed from a static snapshot of the registry collected prior to all experiments and held fixed across training and evaluation. Edge cases of the registry-based oracle—most notably, legitimate packages distributed outside PyPI—are discussed in §7.



Figure 8: Visual depiction of the package detection pipeline to test for package hallucinations, as described in §4.3: Each coding prompt is passed to the model to produce code, then dispatched to two distinct package-elicitation queries: *Mode 1* asks for the packages required to run the generated code, and *Mode 2* asks for packages that would be useful in solving the original task. Each resulting package list is parsed, de-duplicated, and resolved against a snapshot of the PyPI registry; any identifier that fails to resolve is labeled as a hallucination and routed into the tri-mask construction (§4.3).